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Abstract—Pseudorandom bit generators (PRBG) can be de-
signed to take the advantage of some hard number theoretic
problems such as the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Such
type of generators will have good randomness and unpredictabil-
ity properties as it is so difficult to find an easy solution to the
regarding mathematical dilemma. Hash functions in turn play a
remarkable role in many cryptographic tasks to achieve various
security strengths. In this paper, a pseudorandom bit generator
mechanism that is based mainly on the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP) and hash derivation function is pro-
posed. The cryptographic hash functions are used in consuming
applications that require various security strengths. In a good
hash function, finding whatever the input that can be mapped to
any pre-specified output is considered computationally infeasible.
The obtained pseudorandom bits are tested with NIST statistical
tests and it also could fulfill the up-to-date standards. Moreover,
a 256 × 256 grayscale images are encrypted with the obtained
pseudorandom bits following by necessary analysis of the cipher
images for security prove.
Index Terms—Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Hash Function,
Random Bit Generator, Encryption, Decryption
I. INTRODUCTION
A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) which is also
known as a deterministic random number generator (DRNG)
is an algorithm for producing a string of random num-
bers whose characteristics could represent same properties of
strings of random numbers produced from a truly random
number generator (TRNG). The obtained number series from
this PRNG is not considered truly random, because it is
estimated by a comparatively set of known initial values,
called the PRNG’s seed [1]. Although PRNG strings are very
close to TRNG sequences, thus could be generate by the use
of hardware random number generators. Therefore, PRNGs
are fundamental in real world applications for the speed in
generate the numbers and also for their reproducibility. PRNGs
are central in many recent applications such as electronic
games, numerical simulations, statistical research, randomized
algorithms, cryptography and lottery.
In the year 1985, elliptic curve public-key cryptosystems
(also known as elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)), were
introduced by Neal Koblitz [2] and Victor Miller [3]. By
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substituting the subgroup of the multiplicative group Z∗p with
the group of points on an elliptic curve (EC) over a finite field
F, these cryptosystems could be considered as EC analogues
of the traditional discrete logarithm ones. The security be-
yond these EC cryptosystems is proven by the computational
intractability support of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP). Since the ECDLP appears to be signifi-
cantly harder than the ordinary discrete logarithm problem, the
strength-for-key-bit is ultimately greater in elliptic curve based
systems than in classical discrete logarithm based systems.
Thus, parameters with small sizes is used in the case of
ECC morethan with discrete logarithm systems with almost
equivalent levels of security [4]. A worthy number of merits
that could be acquired from the use of such small param-
eters include smaller key sizes, speed (faster computations)
and secured certificates. Such features are important mostly
in environments where bandwidth, storage space, power of
processing, or power consumption is bounded.
EC pseudorandom number generator (EC-PRNG) is con-
sidered to be the EC analogue of the previously mentioned
PRNG. EC-PRNG is based mathematically on the ECDLP and
is counted a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator (CS-PRNG). The idea of making use of ECs to be
source of randomness dates back to early work introduced by
Kaliski [5]. Since then, the use of elliptic curves for generating
pseudorandom numbers has been studied for many years [6]–
[8]. EC-PRNG logically can be separated into two main parts:
one part that generates a sequence of EC points and one that
extracts a bit string from that point sequence as a source of
pseudorandom bits of uniform distribution.
In this study, we proposed a method for generating pseu-
dorandom bit strings based on an elliptic curve points oper-
ations (Add, Double, Multiply) over finite fields (Fp), which
is secured by a hash function. The obtained pseudorandom
bit string constructions are based on EC pseudorandom bit
generator (EC-PRBG), which supported by a hash function
to reinforce the security of an EC-PRNG. It is found that
the statistical properties of the obtained bit strings can be
greatly improved by applying this newly designed mechanism.
Also, EC-PRBG mechanism is more suitable in producing
pseudorandom bits in the EC-based digital signature algorithm
TABLE I
ELLIPTIC CURVE POINTS IN F29
(0, 2) (0, 27) (1, 8) (1, 21) (3, 11) (3, 18)
(6, 9) (6, 20) (7, 8) (7, 21) (10, 12) (10, 17)
(12, 2) (12, 27) (14, 6) (14, 23) (15, 1) (15, 28)
(17, 2) (17, 27) (18, 5) (18, 24) (19, 3) (19, 26)
(20, 7) (20, 22) (21, 8) (21, 21) (25, 9) (25, 20)
(27, 9) (27, 20)
(ECDSA) and session keys in related encryption stages.
This work is formulated as next. The preliminaries of EC
are introduced in Section II. An overview of elliptic curves
over Fp are mentioned in Section II-A. In Section II-B, the
related EC point operations are presented. The cryptographic
hash function is discussed in Section II-C. In Section III, the
pseudorandom bit generator mechanism is proposed. Exper-
imental and NIST test results are presented in Section IV.
In Section V, an image encryption application with various
security analysis is given and finally conclusions are given in
Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Elliptic Curves over Fp
Lets consider an EC to be E over Fp, p > 3, given by the
following affine Weierstrass equation in the form
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b, (1)
where a and b are coefficients belonging to Fp such that 4a
3+
27b2 6= 0. The set of Fp consists of all the points (x, y), x ∈
Fp, y ∈ Fp, which fulfill the defining equation (1), together
with a special point O called the point at infinity [2].
Example 1. Let a prime p = 29 and consider the elliptic
curve E : y2 = x3 + x + 4 defined over F29. This curve has
order 33 and is cyclic. Note that parameters values are a = 1
and b = 4 and 4a3 + 27b2 = 4 + 432 = 436 ≡ 1 (mod 29),
in this case E is considered as an EC. Also points of F29 are
point O and the other points which listed in Table I.
B. Elliptic Curve Point Operations
The addition operation of two points on an elliptic curve
E(Fp) to result in a third point on same curve, the chord-and-
tangent rule is used. With this addition operation, the set of
points E(Fp) forms a group with O serving as its identity.
The formed group is used in the elliptic curve cryptosystem
structure. Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) to be two
featured points on an elliptic curve E. The sum of such points
P and Q, denoted P + Q = R = (x3, y3), is defined as
next. First, a line is drawn through points P and Q; this line
intersects the same EC in a third point as drawn in Figure 1.
As a result, point R is the reflection of that process in the
x-axis [9].
Consider point P = (x1, y1), the double of P which is
denoted 2P = R = (x3, y3), is obtained as follows. The
tangent line with EC at point P is drawn first. This line
Fig. 1. Description of two EC-points addition: P +Q = R
intersects the EC in a second point. As a result, point R is the
reflection of this process in the x-axis as shown in Figure 2.
The sum of two points, also the double of one point is deduced
from algebraic description as follows:
Fig. 2. Description of one EC-point doubling: P + P = 2P = R
1) Note that P +O = O + P all of P ∈ E(Fp).
2) For point P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fp), so that (x, y) +
(x,−y) = O, the point (x,−y) is indicate as −P , so it
is called the negative of P ; notice that −P is in fact a
point on the same curve E.
3) Addition of points P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fp) and Q =
(x2, y2) ∈ E(Fp), with P 6= ±Q. The operation P +
Q = R = (x3, y3), where
x3 =
(
y2−y1
x2−x1
)2
− x1 − x2
and
y3 =
(
y2−y1
x2−x1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1
. (2)
4) Doubling of point P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fp), with P 6=
−P . The operation P + P = 2P = (x3, y3), where
x3 =
(
3x2
1
+a
2y1
)2
− 2x1
and
y3 =
(
3x2
1
+a
2y1
)
(x1 − x3)− y1
. (3)
Note that, the addition of these two points P and Q in
E(Fp) needs some arithmetic operations such as (addition,
subtraction, multiplication, and inversion) in the Fp field .
Example 2. Let EC defined in Example 1 used again.
1) Points P = (3, 11) and Q = (14, 23), so that P +Q =
(x3, y3) can be computed as:
x3 =
(
23−11
14−3
)2
− 3− 14 = 64 ≡ 6(mod 29) (4)
and
y3 = 9(3− 6)− 11 = −38 ≡ 20(mod 29) . (5)
Resulting P +Q = (6, 20)
2) Point P = (3, 11) which doubled as 2P = P + P =
(x3, y3) can be computed as:
x3 =
(
3(32)+1
22
)2
− 6 = 619 ≡ 10(mod 29) (6)
and
y3 = 25(3− 10)− 11 = −186 ≡ 17(mod 29) . (7)
Hence, 2P = (10, 17).
C. Secure Hash Function
The PRBG mechanism can be based on a non-invertible
or one-way hash function [1]. The hash-based EC-PRBG
mechanism which used here is designed to make use of any
suitable secure hash which is used by exhaustion applications
that need different security strengths, providing that a suitable
hash function is utilized and adequate entropy is gained for
the seed value.
Thereafter, H hash function is defined as:
Hi = f(Xi, Hi−1) i = 1, 2, · · · , t (8)
From the equation, f be the round function, Ht is the
hashcode and H0 is equal to an initial value (IV). For hash
function safely usage ought to concur or exceed the in demand
security strength of the exhaustion applications.
III. THE PROPOSED RANDOM BIT GENERATOR
MECHANISM
The proposed EC-PRBG is based on the hardness of ECDLP
which can be described as: given two points P and Q on EC
of order n, how to get a such that Q = aP ?. The EC-PRBG
mechanism is depicted in Figure 3.
The instantiation stage of the EC-PRBG mechanism re-
quires choosing an appropriate EC and points on that curve for
Fig. 3. Pseudorandom Bit Generator Mechanism
the required security strength. The seed value which is used to
locate the initial value (s) of the EC-PRBG must have enough
bits of entropy with sufficient security strength. The value of
t is accounted for the seedlen-bit number in the initial state,
so we can consider that t = s0 in this case. The EC-PRBG
can offer security strength as long as the security strength of
the used curve. The main reason of using the hash function
H is to ensure that the entropy is distributed throughout the
extracted bits, provided that they are verifiably random.
Backtracking resistance in this mechanism is deep-seated,
even in the case that the internal state is vulnerable to
exposure. As shown in Figure 4, EC-PRBG generates a seed
value for each step i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , as follows:
si = ϕ(x([si−1])P ) , i = 1, 2, ...,
Hi = ϕ(x(si), Hi−1) , i = 1, 2, ...,
where s0 ∈ E(Fp) is the ”initial value”. The EC-PRBG
method represents an EC scalar multiplication with the ex-
traction of the x−coordinate from the resulting points si and
from the random hash output Hi with truncation operation to
obtain the output pseudorandom bits. Following a line in the
same direction of the arrow is the normal operation; inverting
that direction reveals the ability to solve the ECDLP for that
specific curve. The ability of an adversary to invert the arrow in
Figure 4, implies that the adversary has solved the ECDLP for
that specific elliptic curve. Backtracking resistance is built into
the mechanism design, as knowledge of s1 does not allow an
adversary to determine s0 (and so forth) unless the adversary is
able to solve the ECDLP for that specific curve. Furthermore,
knowledge of H1 does not allow an adversary to determine s1
(and so forth) unless the adversary is able to solve the ECDLP
for that specific curve.
Fig. 4. EC-PRBG Backtracking Resistance
The EC-PRBG generates pseudorandom bit strings by ex-
tracting bits from an EC points. The internal state of the EC-
PRBG is a secret value s that represents the x-coordinate of a
point on an EC. Output bits are produced by first computing
H to be the x-coordinate of the point [s]P , and then extracting
low order bits from the x-coordinate of the hashcode output
H .
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The implementation of the presented EC-PRBG mechanism
need to include an approved curve. Once the designer chooses
the security level required by a given application, he can then
start the implementation of an EC that most NIST SP 800-90A
[1] appropriately meets this requirement.
A. Implementation Example
The EC-PRBG algorithm allows an exhaustion application
to instantiate using a prime curve. In accordance security key
strengths of 112, 128, 192 and 256 bits may then be supported.
The secure hash algorithm (SHA)-256 is chosen as the hash
function. SHA-256 function generates an almost-unique, fixed
size 256-bit hash. In this experiment, the implementation
process used the following EC equation:
E : y2 = x3 + 4x+ 1 (9)
where a = 4, b = 1 are E parameters over Fp, p = 503 and the
cardinality of E is N = #E(F503) = 516. Also the generator
point G = (283, 315) of order ℓ = 129 is selected for our
EC-PRBG mechanism.
B. The NIST Randomness Tests
The NIST [11] test suite is a statistical package that
consisting of up to 15 tests. It is developed for testing the
randomness of binary strings obtained by either hardware
or software based cryptographic pseudorandom and random
number generators. The 15 tests concentrate on a variety of
different non-randomness types that could exist in a bit strings.
The proposed mechanism produces a very random bit strings
as reflected by the high p-values as shown in Table II.
V. APPLICATION IN IMAGE ENCRYPTION
With the huge amount of the data and high correlation be-
tween the adjacent pixels in images, stream ciphers are highly
preferred over block ciphers in image encryption applications.
The security of digital images need pseudorandom bit strings
that have pretty good randomness properties and also high
periodicity. Recently, several works that using ECs for digital
and medical images encryption has been presented in literature
such as [12]–[16]. In this work, the EC-PRBG is used for
encrypting a 256 × 256 grayscale of Lena image pixels as
shown in Figure 5. Each image pixel has a 8-bit value of
between 0 and 255, so the pseudorandom bit strings in turn
divided into blocks of 8-bit each. Next, bitwise XOR operation
is carried on every bit of the 8-bit block. The resulted bits then
grouped together to obtain the cipherimage. The decryption
process is done vice-versa and the following security analysis
is carried out.
TABLE II
TEST RESULTS FOR 1048576 BIT STRINGS
Test-name P-value Result
Block Frequency (m = 100) 0.046169 Succeed
Frequency 0.681211 Succeed
Cusum (Forward) 0.878529 Succeed
Cusum (Reverse) 0.674391 Succeed
Long Runs of Ones 0.128851 Succeed
Spectral DFT 0.149590 Succeed
Rank 0.638151 Succeed
Lempel Ziv Complexity 1.000000 Succeed
Overlapping Templates (m = 9) 0.120402 Succeed
NonOverlapping Templates (m = 9) 0.197506 Succeed
Approximate Entropy (m = 10) 0.681211 Succeed
Universal (L = 7, Q = 1280) 0.051599 Succeed
Random Excursions (x = +1) 0.297235 Succeed
Serial (m = 16) 0.343750 Succeed
Random Excursions Variant (x = +1) 0.050388 Succeed
Runs 0.499889 Succeed
Linear Complexity (M = 500) 0.703017 Succeed
Fig. 5. EC-PRBG Based Image Encryption Schema
Fig. 6. Lena plainimage and the corresponding cipherimage with the EC-
PRBG mechanism
A. Entropy Analysis
The entropy H(m) of a message source m is calculated
from the equation:
H(m) = −
255∑
k=0
P (mk)log2P (mk) (10)
where P (mk) represents the probability of message mk [17].
The various entropy values for Lena plain and encrypted
image which shown in Figure 6 are indicated in Table III.
It is remarkable that the entropy of the encrypted image is
too close to the theoretical value of 8 which elucidate that
all of the pixels in the encrypted image occur with almost
equal probability. Therefore, the proposed EC-PRBG is secure
against the entropy-based attack and the information leakage
is negligible.
TABLE III
ENTROPY AND BASIC PARAMETERS FOR LENA IMAGE
Scheme Entropy PSNR MAE MSE
Proposed EC-PRBG 7.9971 8.5631 79.52 9305.32
Ref [19] 7.9898 8.5838 —– 9009.33
Ref [20] 7.9968 11.30 79.22 4859.03
B. Mean Absolute Error and Mean Square Error
The cipherimage must demonstrates a significant difference
with it’s corresponding plainimage. This difference can be
measured by two major techniques, Mean Absolute Error
(MAE) and Mean Square Error (MSE) [18]. MAE and MSE
values are calculated by using the following equations:
MAE =
1
W ∗H
H∑
j=1
W∑
i=1
|(Pij − Cij)| (11)
MSE =
1
W ∗H
H∑
j=1
W∑
i=1
(Pij − Cij)
2 (12)
In equations (11) and (12), parameters W and H are the
width and height of that image. Also Pij is the gray level of the
pixel in the plainimage and Ci,j is the gray level of the pixel
in the cipherimage. MAE and MSE values of the cipherimage
are reported in Table III. As shown from the table, MAE and
MSE tests have produced high values which then guarantee
the resistance of the EC-PRBG mechanism against differential
attacks.
C. Peak Signal-to-noise Ratio (PSNR)
PSNR is mainly used in image processing area as a consis-
tent image quality metric [21] and the greater PSNR, the better
the output image quality. The performance of the proposed
EC-PRBG method is estimated on the basis of PSNR and the
measure values obtained are shown in Table III. The obtained
results clearly illustrated that the EC-PRBG mechanism is well
suited for many types of image encryption operations.
D. Correlation Analysis
For any common image, two neighboring pixels in a
plainimage are strongly correlated vertically, horizontally and
diagonally. The maximum value of correlation coefficient is
1 and the minimum value is 0 [22]. Horizontal, vertical and
diagonal directions results are obtained as shown in Table IV
for plainimage of Lena and for it’s ciphered image by the EC-
PRBG method respectively. The obtained results elucidate that
there is negligible correlation between the two adjacent pixels
in the cipherimage, even when this two adjacent pixels in the
plainimage are highly correlated as shown in Figure 8.
E. Sensitivity Analysis
If one small change in a plainimage able to cause a signifi-
cant change in the corresponding cipherimage, with respect to
diffusion and confusion properties, then the known-plaintext
attack actually loses its efficiency and becomes practically
useless. To quantify that demand, two joint measures are used:
Number of Pixels Change Rate (NPCR) and Unified Average
Changing Intensity (UACI) [23]. The test results shown that
the average values of the percentage of pixels changed in
cipherimage is greater than 99.47% for NPCR and 30.48%
for UACI for the pseudorandom bits. This means that the EC-
PRBG method works perfectly and precisely with respect to
small changes in the plainimage pixels.
Fig. 7. Histogram of Lena cipherimage with the EC-PRBG operation
F. Histogram Analysis
To block the information leak to an adversary, an image
encryption schema should always produce a cipherimage of
the uniform histogram for all of the corresponding plainimage
[18]. The histograms for Lena plainimage and cipherimage are
estimated. Lena plainimage histogram contains large spikes
while the histogram of it’s cipherimage is almost flat and uni-
form as depicted in Figure 7 which denotes equal probability
of occurrence of each pixel. Histogram of Lena cipherimage
is remarkably different from the respective plainimage and
consequently does not provide any evidence to appoint known
statistical attacks on the image encryption application.
TABLE IV
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR LENA IMAGE
Scheme Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Plainimage 0.93915 0.96890 0.91686
Proposed EC-PRBG -0.00287 0.03450 0.00196
Ref [19] -0.00041 -0.00025 -0.000027
Ref [20] -0.0043 -0.0090 -0.0031
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a new mechanism for generating
pseudorandom bit strings based on elliptic curve group over
finite fields (Fp) and hash derivation function to achieve high
security levels. The performance analysis and security results
Fig. 8. Correlation of Lena plainimage and cipherimage with the EC-PRBG
showed that the obtained bit strings have high periodicity
and good randomness properties. Moreover, an application
in image encryption based on cipher bit strings stream was
examined and various security analysis of the cipherimage is
reported.
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